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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
McGuire Act, manufacturers can constitutionally enjoin non signers from selling below list in interstate commerce.
Defendants argue that the McGuire Act attempts an unconstitutional delegation to the states of power over interstate commerce. The court answers this by bringing the McGuire Act within the language of the Supreme Court in Southern Pacific Co. v.
State of Arizona ex rel. Sullivan:4" "Congress has undoubtedly
the power to redefine the distribution of power over interstate commerce. It may . . . permit the states to regulate the commerce in
a manner which would otherwise not be permissible." In any
event, the constitutionality of the McGuire Act was upheld by the
for the Fifth Circuit in Schwegman Bros.
U. S. Court of Appeals
47
v. Eli Lilly c Co.
The defendants' other principle attack is against the constitutionality of the Field-Crawford Act. The Court refuses to reconsider those issues decided by the Old Dearborn and Bourjois
Sales cases.

III. CIVM PRACTICE
Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court
An action was brought in the Supreme Court against State
officials asking for equitable relief in the form of the recission of
a bid made by the plaintiffs, and an injunction forbidding the
transfer of the bid check to the State's general fund, and commanding that the check or its proceeds be returned to the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Appellate Division, which had reversed a finding for the plaintiffs by
the trial court, on the ground that the Supreme Court lacked
jurisdiction to entertain the case.'
Suits for the recovery of money paid to State officers in their
official capacity, although nominally brought against the officers
themselves are held to be actions against the state.2 Actions for
the recovery of money from the state must be brought in the
Court of Claims. 3 The plaintiffs in the instant case argued that
since the Court of Claims has no jurisdiction to grant strictly
equitable relief,4 and since no -suit for the return of the deposit
could be maintained until the bid was rescinded, they must neces46. 325 U. S. 761. 769 (1944).
47. 205 F. 2d 788 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 346 U. S. 865 (1953).
1. Psaty v. Duryea, 306 N. Y. 413, 118 N. E. 2d 584 (1954).
2. Samuel Adler, Inc. v. Noyes, 285 N. Y. 34, 32 N. E. 2d 781 (1941).
3. COURT OF CLAImS AcT § 9.
4. Gregory Ferend Co. v. State of New York, 251 App. Div. 13, 295 N. Y. Supp.
715 (3d Dep't 1937), leave to appeal denied 282 N. Y. 808, 26 N. E. 2d 836 (1940).
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sarily proceed in the Supreme Court. The court, recognizing the
plaintiffs' dilemma, insisted, nevertheless, that relief against the
State itself could not be granted in the Supreme Court. Levine
5 a case in which relief similar to that sought by the
v. Parsons,
plaintiff here was granted, was distinguished on the ground that
the question of jurisdiction was not raised.
It was pointed out in the opinion in the present case that,
while the plaintiffs may have no remedy in the courts, their petition will receive consideration on the administrative leveL In
this case the administrative ruling was adverse to the plaintiffs.
It would seem that a review of the defendants' determination
might be sought in the Supreme Court.6 In view of the broad
discretion given to the officials in the treatment of bids once
they have been accepted,' however, the possibility that the administrative decision would be reversed seems highly unlikely.
Statute of Limitations
The New York statute of limitations for judgments provides: "A final judgment or decree for a sum of money . . .
is presumed to be paid and satisfied after the expiration of
twenty years from the time, when the party recovering it was
first entitled to a mandate to enforce it.'"8 It has been held that
the words "judgment or decree" are exclusive and that the section does not apply to an order directing the payment of costs.
0 the Court of Appeals
In Hornblower & Weeks v. Sherwood,"
was called upon to decide if the twenty year limitation applied
to bar the recovery of a fine -for criminal contempt of the Legislature imposed by an order in a civil special proceeding. The
case arose on an action in the nature of interpleader to decide
whether the assignee of the party held in contempt could validly
claim the balance due to that party on his account with the plaintiff. Having been served with a writ of attachment, the plaintiff
had accumulated the money in the account for more than twenty
years. No further attempt was made to collect the money in
spite of the plaintiff's notice to the sheriff of the accumulation.
When the assignee claimed the fund this action was brought by
the plaintiff to determine the right to the fund. The Court of
Appeals, affirming (4-3) the decision of the Appellate Division,
held that the money was still subject to the attachment and there
was no presumption of satisfaction.
5. 258 App. Div. 1003, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 722 (3d Dep't 1940).
6. Under C. P. A. Article 78.
7. PUBLIC BUILDINGS LAW § 8 (4).
8. C. P. A. §44.
9. Warren v. Garlipp, 217 App. Div. 55, 216 N. Y. Supp. 466 (4th Dep't 1926).
10. 307 N. Y. 204, 120 N. E. 2d 790 (1954).

